Fix kiosk login colliding with real staff login

Kiosk sessions were minted under the same cookie name ('hnf_session') as a
real staff session, on the same origin -- the browser can end up holding two
same-named cookies with different scope with no guarantee which one it sends,
so a valid staff login could get shadowed by a stale kiosk cookie (hit
2026-08-26 testing kiosk login on a desktop browser, then unable to log into
the normal manage pages).

Fix: kiosk sessions now live in their own cookie, 'hvac_kiosk_session',
completely independent of the real staff session. hvac's requireAuth checks
hnf_session first, falls back to hvac_kiosk_session. Also dropped the
now-unneeded DOMAIN cross-subdomain cookie scoping -- this cookie is only
ever read by hvac's own backend, so a plain host-scoped cookie is simplest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

backend/src/auth.js

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@ const APP_SLUG = process.env.APP_SLUG || 'hvac'
 const secret = new TextEncoder().encode(process.env.CENTRAL_AUTH_SECRET || '')
 
 export async function requireAuth(request, reply) {
-  const token = request.cookies?.hnf_session
+  // Real staff sessions (hnf_session, issued by central auth) take priority; the
+  // kiosk's own session (hvac_kiosk_session, issued locally by routes/kiosk.js)
+  // is a deliberately separate cookie name so the two can never collide/shadow
+  // each other in the same browser — see project_hvac_kiosk memory, hit
+  // 2026-08-26 when kiosk login on a desktop browser interfered with normal
+  // staff login while both shared the 'hnf_session' name.
+  const token = request.cookies?.hnf_session || request.cookies?.hvac_kiosk_session
   if (!token) return reply.status(401).send({ error: 'Not authenticated' })
 
   let payload

backend/src/routes/kiosk.js

@@ -2,20 +2,28 @@ import { SignJWT } from 'jose'
 import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs'
 import { getConfig } from '../db.js'
 
-const DOMAIN = process.env.DOMAIN || 'localhost'
 const secret = new TextEncoder().encode(process.env.CENTRAL_AUTH_SECRET || '')
 
-// Same shape as central auth's own cookieOpts() (auth/src/routes/auth.js) —
-// Secure only when the request genuinely arrived over HTTPS (NPM's
-// X-Forwarded-Proto), domain scoped the same way, so this cookie behaves
-// identically to one central auth issued.
+// Deliberately its OWN cookie name — NOT 'hnf_session' (central auth's real
+// staff-session cookie). Sharing that name caused a real bug (hit 2026-08-26):
+// testing the kiosk login on a desktop browser left a stale 'hnf_session'
+// cookie behind that could shadow/collide with a subsequent real staff login
+// on the same origin, since the browser will happily hold two same-named
+// cookies with slightly different scope and there's no guarantee which one it
+// sends. A distinct name makes the two sessions fully independent — hvac's own
+// requireAuth (../auth.js) checks hnf_session first, falls back to this one.
+const KIOSK_COOKIE = 'hvac_kiosk_session'
+
+// No DOMAIN-based cross-subdomain scoping needed (unlike central auth's own
+// cookieOpts()) — this cookie is only ever read by hvac's own backend, never
+// by central auth or any other app, so a plain host-scoped cookie is both
+// simplest and narrowest.
 function cookieOpts(request) {
   const proto = request.headers['x-forwarded-proto'] || request.protocol
   return {
     httpOnly: true,
     secure: proto === 'https',
     sameSite: 'lax',
-    domain: DOMAIN === 'localhost' ? undefined : `.${DOMAIN}`,
     path: '/',
     maxAge: KIOSK_SESSION_SECONDS,
   }
@@ -28,11 +36,15 @@ function cookieOpts(request) {
 // expected consequence of shared-secret signing, not a bug.
 const KIOSK_SESSION_SECONDS = 60 * 60 * 24 * 3650
 
-// hvac's own requireAuth (../auth.js) verifies the hnf_session cookie itself
+// hvac's own requireAuth (../auth.js) verifies its session cookies itself
 // against CENTRAL_AUTH_SECRET — it never calls back to central auth at request
-// time. So hvac's backend, holding that same secret, can mint a valid session
-// token directly. No central-auth changes needed at all; the resulting cookie
-// is indistinguishable from one central auth issued, just narrower in scope.
+// time. So hvac's backend, holding that same secret, can mint a valid token
+// directly. No central-auth changes needed at all — this JWT is signed the
+// same way a real staff session is, just carried in its own cookie (see
+// KIOSK_COOKIE above) and narrower in scope (no user_id claim, so central
+// auth's own /verify — which looks up by user_id — correctly rejects it if
+// this token ever reached central auth by mistake; it never should, since
+// requireAuth checks it directly).
 export async function kioskRoutes(app) {
   // Deliberately outside any requireAuth hook — this IS the login route.
   app.post('/api/kiosk/login', async (req, reply) => {
@@ -65,7 +77,7 @@ export async function kioskRoutes(app) {
       .setExpirationTime(`${KIOSK_SESSION_SECONDS}s`)
       .sign(secret)
 
-    reply.setCookie('hnf_session', token, cookieOpts(req))
+    reply.setCookie(KIOSK_COOKIE, token, cookieOpts(req))
     return { ok: true }
   })
 }

docker-compose.yml

@@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ services:
     environment:
       - DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL}
       - CENTRAL_AUTH_SECRET=${CENTRAL_AUTH_SECRET}
-      # Only needed for the kiosk login (routes/kiosk.js), which mints its own
-      # hnf_session cookie locally — matches central auth's own cookie domain
-      # scoping (auth/src/routes/auth.js cookieOpts()) so the two are interchangeable.
-      - DOMAIN=${DOMAIN}
       - SETTINGS_URL=${SETTINGS_URL}
       - SETTINGS_SECRET=${SETTINGS_SECRET}
       - APP_SLUG=hvac